The problem
Growing scientific evidence (IPCC 2007 ) suggests that we cannot stabilize the world climate at safe levels unless we substantially slow down the world emissions of greenhouse gases.
A number of countries have already increased their efforts to curb emissions, notably the (Annex 1) countries that committed to emissions reductions in the Kyoto Protocol. Yet many small and large countries still refrain from taking (strong) action. That raises the question what the chances are of a subset of abating countries to bring down world emissions to safe levels.
We will address this issue by restricting our focus on carbon dioxide that is the most important greenhouse gas. Carbon dioxide emissions (emissions, for short) are generated almost in proportion to burning fossil energy resources (fossil fuel, for short) which are still the dominant source of energy consumption. Any national policy of curbing emissions is bound to raise domestic energy costs and thus enables firms in non-abating countries to expand. For that reason, the effort of abating countries will be offset to some extent by increasing emissions in non-abating countries. That phenomenon has come to be known as carbon leakage. Since it is the aggregate world emissions that determine the damage from climate change, the net emissions cutback by a group of abating countries is smaller than that group's gross emissions reductions. It is conceivable that the induced emissions increase in non-abating countries is equal to or even greater than the gross emissions reduction achieved by the group of abating countries. The extreme case in which demand-reducing measures of abating countries increase rather than reduce aggregate world emissions, as compared to their level in the absence of abatement efforts, is referred to as green paradox by Sinn (2008) .
High rates of carbon leakage would cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of any subglobal abatement strategy as represented, e.g., by the Kyoto approach. Since it is unclear at present whether an effective post-Kyoto agreement will be reached over the next years mandating strong action for all major carbon emitting countries, it is important to have a good understanding of the key mechanisms underlying carbon leakage.
The bulk of research on carbon leakage has been carried out in (large-scale) CGE analyses. According to Burniaux and Martins (2000) the estimates of such models range from leakage rates of 20% to lower bound estimates of 2% to 5%. The IPCC (2007) estimates the leakage effect in about the same range for the climate policy based on the Kyoto Protocol. Burniaux and Martins (2000) conclude from their extensive sensitivity analysis (ibidem, p. 13) that ". . . carbon leakages are small for the range of parameters most frequently quoted in the literature . . .", and they emphasize that this assessment strongly relies on the assumption that the supply of coal is fairly elastic over the medium term. Felder and Rutherford (1993) , Paltsev (2001) , Babiker (2005) , Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) , Marschinski et al. (2008) and others provide further informative insights into various channels and determinants of carbon leakage.
The prevailing view of relatively modest leakage rates is challenged by a line of research in the area of (intertemporal) theory of nonrenewable natural resources that takes as its point of departure an extraction path of fossil fuel that is suboptimally steep in laissezfaire e.g. because of the global warming externality (Sinn 1982 p. 360) verdict is that ". . . if suppliers feel threatened by a gradual greening of (demandreducing) policies in the Kyoto countries that would damage their future prices; they will extract their stocks more rapidly, thus accelerating global warming" (Sinn 2008, p. 360) .
From this perspective the prevailing view on the effectiveness of demand-reducing policies is flawed because the public and academic discourse (including the Stern Review 2006) has largely neglected the close link between the economics of global change and the economics of non-renewable resources and has therefore failed to account for the supply side of the problem in an appropriate way.
The supply-side-literature aggregates all fossil-fuel consuming countries into a single country which amounts to presupposing full cooperation of all countries. Yet the very notion of carbon leakage as introduced above requires distinguishing abating and nonabating countries since carbon emissions leak from the former to the latter, after all. 1 prevailing real-world scenario in a stylized way by constructing a three-country economy consisting of a fossil-fuel exporting country, an abating country and a non-abating country.
The abating country represents the coalition of countries that have committed to observe binding national emissions caps à la Kyoto and the non-abating country stands for the rest of the world (except the fuel exporting countries) assumed to refrain from taking (strong) action to curb emissions. To keep a clear focus on leakage, we do not deal with environmental damage from carbon emissions and optimal corrective policies.
In that general equilibrium framework we explore the conditions for carbon leakage and the green paradox. We investigate by means of comparative static analysis how much carbon leaks into the non-abating country when the abating country tightens its emissions cap and when the resource supplier follows a (simplified) Hotelling rule. We find that carbon leakage is unavoidable and the green paradox may occur depending on the interplay of demand conditions, in particular the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in demand, and supply conditions, especially the price elasticities of fuel demand. There are parameter constellations under which the green paradox may occur when the emissions constraint is tightened either in the first or in the second period. The proposition which ties the green paradox to the "gradual greening of (demand-reducing) policies" therefore does not receive unambiguous support from our analysis.
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When more countries join the coalition of abating countries less carbon tends to leak into the non-abating countries. The incidence of reducing emissions (= tightening the emissions cap) either in the first or in the second period is shown to be mirror-symmetric: Essentially, parameter constellations under which the green paradox is avoided, when the first-period cap is tightened, tend to generate a green paradox, when the second-period cap is tightened, and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 investigates the determinants of carbon leakage and the green paradox when the abating country tightens its first-period emissions cap. Section 4 explores the effects of enlarging the group of abating countries. In Section 5 the same issues as in Section 3 are addressed for the case that the abating country tightens its second-period emissions cap. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider a two-period model with three (groups of) countries A, N and F , where A is the abating country, N is the non-abating country and F is the fossil-fuel exporting country.
Except for their carbon emissions control (see below) the economies of the countries A and N are alike. In period t = 1, 2 each country i = A, N produces the output x s it of the consumption good X with the input e it of fossil fuel according to the increasing and strictly concave production function
The countries A and N import all fossil fuel from country F that is endowed with a stock of fossil fuel,ē. Country F does not produce good X but rather buys that good from the countries A and N paying for those imports with the revenues from exporting fossil fuel.
The representative consumer of country i derives utility from consumption x i1 in period 1 and from x i2 in period 2 according to the intertemporal utility function
which is increasing in both arguments and quasi-concave. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (in consumption), defined as
is a property of the utility function that will turn out to play an important role in the subsequent analysis.
In each period, good X and fossil fuel are traded on perfectly competitive world markets (comprising all three countries) at prices p xt and p et , respectively. For t = 1, 2 the market clearing conditions are
where e F t is the fossil fuel supply of country F in period t. Obviously, the supplies e F t for t = 1, 2 need to satisfy the intertemporal constraint
The countries A and N differ with respect to their carbon emissions regulation. We envisage an international agreement on reducing carbon emissions like the Kyoto protocol that does not encompass all countries in the world. Country N represents the group of fuel-consuming countries that do not participate in the agreement and hence do not constrain their carbon emissions at all. 
The caps can either be imposed directly, or through a tax-and-standard scheme or through an emissions trading system. Given the high level of abstraction of our model all these policies of implementing an emissions cap are equivalent. To simplify the exposition we refer to emissions trading only in the subsequent analysis assuming that the emissions permits are auctioned at some price π t , t = 1, 2, that is determined endogenously.
Each country hosts a representative firm generating the profit
where π 2 ≡ 0 if (6a) applies. In (7) -(9) we have not discounted the second-period profits, because in the absence of capital investment the market rate of interest is zero. Moreover, the firm in country F does not incur any extraction costs. While this assumption is not realistic 5 it is not central for the qualitative conclusions to be derived.
The first-order conditions of maximizing (7), (8) and (9) read, respectively,
4 When climate is treated as a global public good, the business-as-usual scenario is commonly modeled as a Nash equilibrium where each country's emissions-reduction policy is the best reply to the other countries' abatement efforts. For the resultant "free-rider leakage" in such an approach see e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) . In our model governments do not play Nash. Instead they do or do not take action depending on their (non)commitment in a Kyoto-type international agreement. 5 In fact, zero extraction costs tend to favor carbon leakage because it makes the supply of fossil fuel perfectly elastic. For the consideration of stock-dependent extraction costs see Sinn (2008) .
We assume π 1 > 0 in (10) because we consider an emissions capē A1 that is strictly binding in the relevant range of equilibrium prices.
6
As noted above, π 2 ≡ 0 if (6a) applies and π 2 > 0 if the relevant constraints are given by (6b). In case of p e1 = p e2 the fossil-fuel selling firm would sell all fossil fuel either in the first or in the second period generating an excess demand in that period in which its supply is zero. Hence equation (11) represents a necessary (arbitrage) condition for equilibrium.
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In equilibrium, the firm is indifferent between selling its fossil fuel in period 1 or 2.
The consumer maximizes utility (2) subject to her budget constraint
which yields
We have thus completed the description of the model and are ready for studying the impact of policy changes in country A. In the next Section 3 we will consider the policy scenario (6a) and investigate the allocative effects when country A tightens its emissions capē A1 (dē A1 < 0). Section 4 explores the effects of enlarging the group of abating countries and after that we will turn to the scenario (6b) in Section 5 and investigate the impact of the policy changes (dē A1 < 0 and dē A2 = 0) as well as (dē A1 = 0 and dē A2 < 0).
Tightening the emissions cap in the first period
Consider a competitive equilibrium in the three-country model (1) -(5), (6a), (7) - (14) in which the constraint (6a) is strictly binding and suppose the emissions capē A1 is tightened:
< 0. Carbon leakage is said to occur ifê N 1 /ê A1 < 0. Carbon leakage is particularly severe, if the reduction of carbon emissions in country A is overcompensated by the (induced) increase in carbon emissions in country N, i.e. ifê F 1 /ê A1 < 0. In such 6 Sufficient for (10) and (11) are the regularity conditions lim ejt→0 X j ejt = ∞ and lim ejt→∞ X j ejt = 0 for j = A, N and t = 1, 2 which we assume to hold.
7 The Hotelling rule requires the market rate of interest to equal the rate of increase in the price of the natural resource. Since in our model the market rate of interest is zero by assumption, (12) is a simplified version of the Hotelling rule. 8 In (12) Π i * is the maximum profit of the firm in country i. The budget constraints can be rearranged to
for i = A, N and t (p et e F t − p xt x F t ) = 0 which turn out to be the countries' intertemporal trade balances.
9 Throughout the paper the 'hat variables' are defined asŷ = dy/y. a situation tightening the emissions control in country A increases total carbon emissions in period 1, which is called 'green (policy) paradox'. Country A's effort of fighting global warming actually turns out to promote global warming.
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We aim at investigating the conditions under which the green paradox occurs in the analytical framework developed in Section 2. For that purpose we first determine the displacement effect ofê A1 = 0 on the intertemporal market for fossil fuel:
e F 1 · e F 1 =ē A1êA1
In (15),
< 0 is country N ′ s price elasticity of demand for fossil fuel in period 1 and γ p := −p e1 (e A2 η A2 + e N 2 η N 2 ) > 0. We are in the position to show
is homothetic.
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Proof. Contrary to the ascertion suppose thatp x2 /ê A1 < 0. In that case (15b) yieldŝ
and then using (10) -(12) yieldŝ
e F têF t =ê At e At +ê N t e N t t = 1, 2,
Taking advantage ofê F 1 /ê A1 > 0,ê F 2 /ê A1 < 0, and (18) in (16) and (17), we get (x
. Consider now the demand side and observe that (14) implies
10 In view of (5) we have sign (ê F 1 /ê A1 ) = −sign (ê F 2 /ê A1 ). As the goal of climate policy is to delay the consumption of fossil fuel, tightening the emissions capê A1 promotes that goal only ifê F 1 /ê A1 > 0. 11 (15a) is derived in the Appendix.
12 Throughout the rest of the paper good X in peroid 1 is chosen as numeraire (p x ≡ 1). Since all utility functions are assumed to be identical we have σ i = σ and q
This contradiction proves the claimp x2 /ê A1 > 0.p e1 /ê A1 > 0 is straightforward from p x2 /ê A1 > 0 and (A30), and de F 1 /dē A1 < 1 follows from (15b).
Proposition 1 conveys the important messages that if country A tightens its firstperiod emissions cap the world market price of fossil fuel (in terms of first-period consumption) falls and first-period consumption becomes more expensive relative to second-period consumption.
14 For both reasons it is profitable for the firms in country N to expand their output and hence their fossil fuel consumption. Equation (15a) specifies the first-period emissions reduction induced by tightening the capē A1 (ê A1 < 0 and creates the possibility of the green paradox which will then occur if and only if the effect [3] is sufficiently strong. As response toê A1 < 0, the increase in e F 1 due to [3] is larger the more price elastic the aggregate fuel demand is in period 2 (γ p larger), the more price elastic the fuel demand of country N is in period 1 (|η N 1 | larger), and the greater isp x2 /ê A1 . The role of effect [3] is to equilibrate the markets for the consumption good in both periods while maintaining the equilibrium in the markets for fossil fuel through an appropriate reduction in p e1 . This observation highlights that the effect 
Figure 1: Impact of tightening the emissions cap in period 1 line CS. For fossil-fuel prices less than 0 1 T country A's fuel demand is constant atē
while country N's demand expands with sinking prices along CS.
According to (10) and (11) the aggregate second-period demand for fossil fuel can be depicted in Figure 1 only for some predetermined price p x2 . Suppose, p 0 x2 is the equilibrium value of p x2 when country A has fixed the emissions capē 
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In their first-period production plan myopic firms in country N would have ignored the reduction in p x2 . However, with their two-period planning horizon and perfect future markets the firms in our model account forp x2 /ê A1 > 0 and they also anticipate the subsequent reduction in p e1 (Hotelling rule). When the input price p e1 falls and the output price remains constant (p x1 ≡ 1), it is profitable for the firms in country N to expand their output and fossil fuel input. This is why the effect [3] from (15a) works counter country A's cap tightening.
According to (15b) and Proposition 1 the price changep x2 is the key determinant for the green paradox because -as we have illustrated with the help of Figure 1 -it is crucial how large the reduction in p x2 must be to bring about the necessary equilibrium condition
To better understand the relation betweenp x2 andq d we resort to the class of CES utility functions that are homogeneous of degree b > 0:
where a 1 > 0, a 2 > 0 and e := (1 − σ)/σ. When combined with (14), standard calculations lead to
The equilibrium condition is
where the function Q s is implicitly determined in (19).
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The equilibrium price p x2 is uniquely determined by (23) and it obviously depends on both σ andē A1 .
In Figure 2 we have plotted the graphs of Q For homothetic utility functions (not restricted to CES functions) we calculate the impact on p x2 of tightening the capē A1 in full-scale comparative statics analysis (Appendix)
where
which is positive -as we already know from Proposition 1. To make further progress in exploring the conditions for the green paradox we insert (24) into (15b) to obtain, after some rearrangement of terms,
In (25), the term x s A1 + x s N 1 is positive and the term π 1 e N 1 η N 1 is negative. Therefore, σ = 0 impliesê F 1 /ê A1 < 0 (the green paradox occurs!) while for σ > 0 the sign ofê F 1 /ê A1 is ambiguous. We conclude from (25) that
Proposition 2 .
Suppose the utility function is homothetic and the capē A1 is tightened.
Then the green paradox occurs if and only if σ <σ
For Leontief utility functions (σ = 0) the green paradox occurs but it does not occur in the case of utility functions exhibiting sufficiently large substitution elasticities. If we consider the class of isoelastic utility functions
where ρ is a positive pure rate of time preference, we find that η = 
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The main message of Proposition 2 in combination with Figure 2 is that the lower the substitution elasticity the greater is the price effectp x2 /ê A1 and the more likely is the green paradox.
Proposition 2 focusses on the intertemporal substitution elasticity as a determinant of the green paradox. Note, however, that the size of the threshold valueσ defined in Proposition 2 also depends on the size of the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuel, η N 1 , which is entirely technology-determined. To get more information on the interaction of demand and supply conditions yielding the green paradox we parametrize the production function by
For production functions (28), the equivalence (26) simplifies tô
From (29) we infer Proposition 3 . Suppose the utility function is homothetic, the production function X N (e N 1 ) from (1) is specified by (28) and the capē A1 is tightened.
(i) Then the green paradox occurs if and only if σ · (1 − θ N 1 ) < γ θ1 .
(ii) The green paradox does not occur, either
18 It is also worth mentioning that the condition for the green paradox does not hinge upon the pure rate of time preference.
.
Proof of Proposition 3(ii).
Total first-period profits are
which are positive according to (10) and (11) (and footnote 6). Using that definition of Π 1 we rewrite γ θ1 from (29) as
Proposition 3 highlights the relevance for the green paradox of the production technology in country N and period 1 and of the interaction of supply and demand conditions. Proposition 3 conforms with our intuition that a highly elastic demand for fossil fuel in country N is conclusive to the green paradox. That elasticity is the higher the closer to one is the production parameter θ N 1 , i.e. the more the production function tends to be linear. Yet even if θ N 1 is small the green paradox occurs according to Proposition 3(i) if σ is sufficiently small. On the other hand, Proposition 3(ii) states conditions to avoid the green paradox. Proposition 3(ii) does not imply, however, that avoiding the green paradox requires σ > 1, because the conditions for Proposition 3ii to hold are sufficient but not necessary. To sum up, according to the Propositions 2 and 3 the green paradox depends on the order of magnitude of the parameters σ and θ N 1 . This calls for a thorough discussion of the empirical estimates of those parameters which is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper.
Enlarging the group of abating countries
Up to now we have not made any explicit assumption about the size of the abating country A compared to the size of the non-abating country N. We will do so now in the simplest possible way by introducing a fixed world endowment of an immobile (internationally non- 
where θ ∈]0, 1[. Note first that in the absence of emissions capping the aggregate demand functions for fossil fuel (in either period) are independent of ℓ. This is easily verified by combining (30) with the profit maximizing condition X i e it = p t (with p 1 = p e1 and p 2 = p e2 /p x2 ) to calculate the countries' fuel demand functions as
Adding up these equations shows that for any given p t the sum e At +e N t remains unchanged when ℓ is varied. We interpret an increase in ℓ as new countries joining the group of abating countries which we continue to address as "country A". Differentiating country A's fuel demand function yieldsp
If we would increase ℓ and would keep constant the emissions capē A1 we would combine enlarging the group with tightening the cap for all members of the group. To avoid such mixed strategy we will considerl =ê At > 0, a scenario, that appears plausible since it impliesp e1 = 0 so that the new countries entering the abatement coalition commit to the same constraint as the old members. . . In that case no leakage occurs anymore no matter how strong the downward shift of the curve LM may be. ℓ = 1 means that there is a global coalition in which all countries commit to reduce emissions. In that case our model turns out to be a very simple version of Sinn's (2008) model who considers a single 'aggregate' fuel-demanding country representing the global coalition of all fuel-demanding countries. In that case carbon leakage is trivially absent.
However, as we know from the Kyoto protocol the global coalition is far from being a realistic scenario.
Tightening the emissions cap in the second period
In this section we assume that country A regulates emissions not only in the first period, but also in the second. The model now consists of the equations (1) -(5), (6b), (7) - (14), and a green paradox is said to occur, ifê F 1 /ê A1 < 0 or ifê F 1 /ê A2 < 0. Let us first consider the impact ofê A1 < 0 andê A2 = 0:
Consider the policyê A1 < 0 andê A2 = 0 of country A. In qualitative terms, the conditions for carbon leakage and the green paradox are the same as under the policyê A1 < 0, when e A2 is unconstrained.
As shown in the Appendix, the only change necessary is replacing γ p > 0 byγ p := −p e2 e N 2 η N 2 > 0. With this slight modification the equations (15b), (24) and (25) continue to hold and hence the Propositions 1 through 3 apply.
Next, we explore the policyê A2 < 0 andê A1 = 0. The displacement effects ofê A2 = 0 onê F 1 are formally given bŷ
(31)
Proposition 5 .p x2 /ê A2 < 0,p e1 /ê A2 < 0 and de F 1 /dē A2 > −1 if the utility function is homothetic.
Proof. Contrary to the ascertion suppose thatp x2 /ê A2 > 0. In that case we obtain e F 1 /ê A2 > 0 andê F 1 /ê A2 < 0. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 the last inequalities translate into (x
This condition contradicts the necessary equilibrium condition (q s −q d )/ê A2 = 0, which provesp x2 /ê A2 < 0.p e1 /ê A2 < 0 follows fromp x2 /ê A2 < 0 and (A54), and de F 1 /dē A2 > −1 follows from (31).
We proceed by considering the price effect (derived in the Appendix)
whereD
Insert (32) into (31) to obtain, after some rearrangement of terms,
implyingê
Comparing ( Closer inspection of (34) leads to Proposition 6 . Suppose the utility function is homothetic and the capē A2 is tightened.
Then the green paradox does not occur if and only if σ <σ := −
The impact of σ established in Proposition 2 is reversed in Proposition 6. More specifically, if we tighten the first-period cap (ê A1 < 0) and either have the second-period cap constant ê A2 = 0 or do not implement a second-period cap (e A2 free) we can exclude the green paradox for sufficiently large values of σ. In contrast, under the policyê A2 < 0 andê A1 = 0 the green paradox is excluded for sufficiently small values of σ.
Following the procedure in Section 3 we now invoke the parametric function (28) again to complement our findings of Proposition 6. With the production function (28) the equivalence (34) turns intô
The information contained in (35) is summarized in Proposition 7 . Suppose the utility function is homothetic, the production function X N (e N 2 ) from (1) is specified by (28) and the capē A2 is tightened.
(i) Then the green paradox occurs if and only if σ · (1 − θ N 2 ) < γ θ2 .
Summarizing, the impact on carbon leakage of σ and θ as established in the Propositions 2 and 3 is reversed in the Proposition 6 and 7. All parameter changes that make the green 20 This reversal is exclusively due to the fact that we focus on the impact ofê A2 on e F 1 rather than on e F 2 (because we are interested in total emissions in period 1). If we had explored the effect ofê A2 on e F 2 we could have simply referred to Section 3 interchanging the indexes 1 and 2 everywhere. This observation can be easily verified by carrying out such a swap of indexes in Figure 1 .
paradox more likely when the cap is tightened in period 1 work in opposite direction when the cap is tightened in period 2. In particular, the green paradox will likely occur when the emissions control is strengthened in the second period, if it does not result from tightening the emissions cap in the first period and vice versa.
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It is informative to highlight from a different perspective our finding that tightening the first-period and the second-period caps, respectively, tends to affect leakage in opposite directions. To this end suppose that a cap effectively constrains the second-period emissions in country A while first-period emissions are unconstrained. Suppose further that analogous to our exercise in Section 4 the coalition of abating countries becomes larger and tends toward the global coalition (ℓ → 1). If ℓ = 1, total emissions in period 2 are strictly capped, say atē F 2 . The smallerē F 2 the greater are necessarily total first-period emissions and the more pronounced is the green paradox.
Concluding remarks
Following Ockham's razor, we have abstracted from many real-world complexities such as extending the time horizon beyond two periods, or including stock-dependent extraction costs, capital accumulation and insecure property rights. Without doubt, all of these aspects are empirically relevant but they do not appear to be at the core of the green-paradox phenomenon. To remain focused we also refrained from getting involved in the controversial though important debate on normative 'social' discounting, time preference and intertemporal inequality aversion. Our use of the demand parameters is meant to be descriptive which does not exclude extending the analysis to normative issues, of course.
We have applied the economics of intertemporal allocation of non-renewable natural resources in its simplest form and have been able to show how this theory drives the results.
As is well known, in a perfectly competitive world with a full set of future markets a necessary equilibrium condition is that resource extracting and supplying firms are indifferent between selling the resource today or at any other period in the future (Hotelling rule in the wide sense; here: p e1 = p e2 ). The requirement of clearing the market for the consumption good in both periods combined with the Hotelling rule tends to exacerbate carbon leakage when the first-period emissions cap is tightened in the abating countries. An interesting re-21 This result has an important implication for policies of tightening the emissions caps in both periods simultaneously, because the net impact on carbon leakage of simultaneous reductions in the caps of both periods is the result of "forces" working in opposite direction. More precisely, it can be shown that ifê A1 andê A2 are tightened proportionally i.e.ê A1 = βē A2 eA1ê A2 where β :=
then there is no impact on total emissions in period 1 at all i.e.ê
sult is also that the impact of strengthened emissions control depends crucially on whether that policy is carried out in the first or in the second period. All determinants of carbon leakage resulting from tightening the first-period cap work in opposite direction when the second-period cap is tightened. However the extent of carbon leakage is determined by the interaction of various parameters and elasticities. Our model gives no unambiguous support to the proposition that tightening the second-period cap necessarily leads to the green paradox and we cannot confirm either that the green paradox results from tightening the second-period cap, if and only if it does not occur when the first-period cap is tightened.
Our analysis suggests that apart from specific characteristics of consumer preferences and production technologies it is the general equilibrium approach in a model with a complete set of perfectly competitive markets and the corresponding account of interdependence effects of markets across countries (space) and time which determines the allocation of resources including the extent of carbon leakage. Such an approach is certainly satisfactory from an intellectual viewpoint because of its consistency. However, one also needs to know how empirically relevant it is to model economic agents and policy makers who anticipate in their plans -and trade on -perfect markets from the presence into the far future. Addressing that issue is beyond the scope of the present paper. But as fighting global change is an urgent empirical policy issue, assessing the reliability of theoretical guidance ought to be high on the agenda of future research, in particular, because many contributions to this issue do not integrate their economics of global change into the established intertemporal theory of nonrenewable resources.
Emissions cap in the first period
The competitive equilibrium of the model is characterized by the following equations
e − e F 1 − e F 2 = 0,
Without loss of generality good X in period t = 1 is chosen as numeraire (p x1 ≡ 1). The variables determined by (A1)-(A12) are e i1 , e i2 , x i1 , x i2 for i = A, F, N, p e1 , p e2 , p x2 and π 1 .
The emissions capē A1 is treated here as an exogenous parameter. Total differentiation of (A1) -(A12) yields, after some rearrangement of terms,
e F têF t − e AtêAt − e N têN t = 0, t = 1, 2, (A18)
e N1 X N e N1 e N1 < 0, η i2 :=
e i2 X i e i2 e i2 < 0,
Derivation of (15a) and (24):
Making use of (A24) in (A20), (A21) and (A22), respectively, yieldŝ
Making use of (A15) and (A16) in (A23), one gets
Inserting (A25) -(A27), (A1) in (A28) and rearranging terms yields
for i = A, F, N. Solving (A18) with respect toê F t , inserting this term in (A19) and making use of (A14) -(A17) we obtain
We solve (A30) forp e1 and insert this term inê F 1 e F 1 =ē A1êA1 + e N 1 η N 1pe1 which follows from (A14), (A17) and (A18), to obtain (15a) after some rearrangement of terms.
(A29) and (A30) jointly determinep x2 andp e1 . These equations read in matrix notation γ e −γ x (γ p − p e1 e N 1 η N 1 ) −γ p p e1 N 1 η N 1 ) .
The function Q s (ē A1 , p x2 ) and its derivatives
We start at equation (A30) which can be rearranged tô
Differentiation of (1) yieldŝ 
Making use of (A14) -(A17), (A37), (A38) in (A39) we get
e N 2 η N 2 · p e1ēA1êA1 + p e1 e N 1 η N 1px2 γ p − p e1 e N 1 η N 1 . 
From Proposition 1 and its proof we know that dp x2 dē A1
> 0 and
> 0. In view of (A45), dq s dē A1 > 0 can only be satisfied for dp x2 dē A1 > 0 and Q 
Emissions caps in both periods
The competitive equilibrium of the model is characterized by (A1), (A2), (A3) for i = N, (A4) -(A12)
e A2 −ē A2 = 0.
Total differentiation of these equations yields (A13), (A14), (A15) for i = N, (A16) -(A19), − (e A1 + e A2 ) p e1pe1 + X A (e A2 ) − x A2 p x2px2 = 0.
Making use of (A24) in (A50), (A21) and (A22) yieldŝ
(A26) and (A27).
Next, we insert (A15) and (A16) and (A49) in (A23) to obtaiñ γ p (p x2 −p e1 ) + (p e2 + π 2 )ē A2êA2 = p x2 x A2xA2 + p x2 x B2xB2 + p x2 x F 2xF 2 ,
whereγ p := −e N 2 η N 2 p e2 > 0.
Inserting (A51), (A26), (A27) in (A52) and rearranging terms we get
γ e :=γ p + p x2 x F 2 − j=A,N λ j p e1 e j .
Solving (A18) with respect toê F t , inserting this term in (A19) and making use of (A14) -(A17) and (A47) we obtain −(γ p − p e1 e N 1 η N 1 )p e1 +γ ppx2 = −p e1ēA1êA1 − p e2ēA2êA2 .
We solve (A54) forp e1 and insert this term intoê F 1 e F 1 = e N 1 η N 1pe1 to establish after some rearrangement of terms (31).
Next, solving (A53) and (A54) yieldŝ Inserting (A55) in (15b) and (A56) in (31) we obtain e F 1 e A1 =γ pēA1 λ e F 1D σ j=A,F,N
e F 1 e A2 = p e1 e N 1 η N 1ēA2 e F 1D λσ j=A,F,N x j1 + (1 − λ)π 2 e N 2 η N 2 .
Finally, we rearrange (A58) with the help of λx j1 = (1 − λ)p x2 x j2 tô e F 1 e A2 = (1 − λ)p e1 e N 1 η N 1ēA2 e F 1D σ j=A,F,N p x2 x j2 + π 2 e N 2 η N 2 .
